The United Kingdom welcomes this Security Dialogue and the opportunity to strengthen implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. Today’s focus, compliance mechanisms, awareness within armed forces, and investigation of violations, is central to the Code’s continued relevance. We must also address the implications when a participating State systematically fails to meet these standards.
The Code requires armed forces to act in accordance with international humanitarian law, remain accountable to constitutional authorities, and be properly instructed on their obligations. Defence policy and doctrine must reflect these principles. This underscores that the internal conduct of armed forces is not solely domestic, but fundamental to trust and stability across the OSCE area.
Russia’s treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war is a clear test to the implementation of the Code. In March 2025, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded that Russian authorities committed torture amounting to crimes against humanity and documented cases of captured or surrendering Ukrainian soldiers being killed or wounded. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission reported in February 2025 that it had documented 79 executions of captured Ukrainian personnel in 24 incidents since August 2024. 697 (96%) of 725 released Ukrainian POWs interviewed provided accounts of torture or ill-treatment in Russian captivity. The OSCE Moscow Mechanism report of September 2025 reached similar conclusions. This is a systematic, widespread and consistent pattern, not isolated incidents.
Equally concerning is the lack of accountability from the Russian Federation. Evidence from UN bodies, OSCE mechanisms, and independent organisations indicates no credible system of investigation, enforcement, or corrective action, pointing instead to persistent practices incompatible with the Code.
Russia’s obligations must also be extended to the treatment of their own personnel. A leaked database (February 2025) indicated amputations were classified as minor injuries, with soldiers returning rapidly to the front before they are physically and mentally ready to be redeployed. In December 2024, hospitalised soldiers posted videos alleging they were sent back to combat before recovery had been completed, contradicting the Kremlin’s claims that 95% of wounded personnel are properly rehabilitated.
Further concerns arise from Russia’s recruitment and use of foreign fighters. An April 2026 study by FIDH, Truth Hounds, and the Kharkiv Institute for Social Research, based on a nine-month investigation and POW interviews, found evidence of deceptive recruitment practices and limited preparation before deployment. It also indicated differential treatment, including assignment to higher-risk roles and weaker support compared to Russian nationals.
These issues are clearly critical when we look to the Code’s requirements on accountability, transparency, and proper organisation of forces.
The credibility of the Code depends on recognising when it is not upheld. Reporting from the United Nations, OSCE mechanisms, and credible international organisations demonstrate that Russia is failing to meet key obligations, in its treatment of prisoners of war, its duty of care to its own personnel, and aspects of force generation.
