During President Donald Trump’s state visit to China a few days ago, President Xi Jinping burnished his intellectual credentials by citing the Thucydides Trap during talks with his counterpart.
He explained to the quite possibly bemused US leader how the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece between two superpowers of the time, Athens and Sparta, arose from their inability to manage their respective interests, one being a nation in the ascendant unnecessarily provoking fear in the other. No prizes for guessing which role China thinks it is playing now. The exposition carried an unusually explicit warning about US-Chinese geopolitical rivalry: “Can we work together to address global challenges and bring more stability to the world?” More privately, and in the context of the future of Taiwan, President Xi left Mr Trump in no doubt about his meaning.
According to the “readout” in Beijing, Mr Xi stressed that if Taiwan is handled properly, the relationship can retain “overall stability. Otherwise, the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy.” Mr Trump promptly put his $11bn arms deal with Taiwan on hold while he consults Taipei; the trap was avoided, but not permanently.
President Xi will have no need to invoke the lessons of history to Vladimir Putin, who arrived in the Chinese capital almost as soon as Air Force One flew out. President Putin will be treated with at least as much respect as Mr Trump, and with rather more warmth: it is the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, after all. President Putin will be presented very much as an equal, and his country as a superpower, and that recognition of status will help Mr Putin with the television audience back home. There will be much talk of their “friendship without limits”.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt about which is the senior partner in this relationship. Never before has there been such a power imbalance between Russia and China as there is today. Russia’s economy, for example, is about the size of Italy’s, while China’s is comparable to that of the United States. Russia possesses a considerable war machine, yet, as the sorry history of the “special military operation” in Ukraine has shown, it is not a particularly effective one.
Russia has been reduced to a supplier to China of commodities such as cereals, timber, oil and natural gas. Underlining the point, the establishment of a second trans-Siberian gas pipeline (an eastern equivalent of the now-defunct Nord Stream in Europe) is a principal objective of this summit. (One of the more unfortunate consequences of President Trump’s war of choice in Iran was to boost Russian oil and gas exports to China).
In return, China is a leader in AI, supplies Russia with advanced military and civilian technology, and bankrolls the Ukraine campaign. Without Chinese industrial, technological and financial support, the Russian economy would long since have collapsed.
President Putin knows this, and that his domestic situation is difficult, thanks to inflation and the never-ending war in Ukraine. He has lost key allies abroad, including Syria, Iran and Tehran’s militant proxies. On the other side of the negotiating table, President Xi is in his pomp, cultivating a Mao-style personality cult and extending Chinese influence and control of assets, notably critical minerals, across the globe via the Belt and Road Initiative and other such projects.
The geopolitical “optics” emanating from Beijing over the last week or so have thus confirmed that this is becoming China’s century, just as the last one was the US’s, and the 19th was one of British hegemony. As the world has seen over the last year, even the US cannot bully China over trade, and when Mr Trump launched his absurd tit-for-tat escalation of tariffs last year, Mr Xi matched them hike for hike, and reminded Mr Trump that “trade wars have no winner”, as American soy producers threatened with ruin last year would readily concur.
What remains of “the West” has still not worked out how to respond to a more assertive China. The People’s Republic has an appalling human rights record, oppresses its minorities and has betrayed the treaty guaranteeing the autonomy of Hong Kong. It spies on the West, and has been accused of neo-colonialism in Africa. Yet it cannot be ignored, and the question of Taiwan in particular is becoming increasingly dangerous. If Mr Putin can invade Ukraine, and Mr Trump intends to occupy Greenland – well, Mr Xi may wonder, what about Taiwan?
For the West, avoiding the Thucydides Trap is about much more than appeasing China; it is about forging a new realistic and pragmatic relationship that involves recognition of the legitimate Chinese aspiration for a peaceful reunification by consent of their nation. The challenge to China is to build a role in the world where it actively works for peace – and that means help in ending the conflicts in Iran and Ukraine.
China initiated neither but it too is suffering from their impacts, and has the power to help bring them to a close by pressuring Moscow and Tehran. There is a deal to be done with China, as previous American presidents have realised, because the US and Europe are vastly more important economic partners than Russia or Iran; but somehow such a vision seems to have eluded the author of The Art of the Deal. It’s unlikely Xi Jinping will ever feel the urge to study passages from that particular contribution to civilisation.
