Chair,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States thank Director General Grossi for his report on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.
We commend the Agency for its continued efforts to verify Iran’s implementation of its safeguards obligations and to clarify information regarding the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
Unfortunately, due to Iran’s prolonged failure to address the outstanding safeguards issues, the Agency is unable to provide assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
Chair,
Yet again, Iran has not provided technically credible explanations in response to the IAEA’s questions regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at Turquzabad and Varamin. These investigations have been running for over five years. Regarding the discrepancy linked to Iran’s previous undeclared uranium metal activities, we are concerned by the Agency’s assessment that, after additional evaluation of the data related to past experiments conducted at JHL, the amount of nuclear material unaccounted for is even greater than previously communicated and cannot be explained by accountancy measurement errors. As long as such cases exist and are not fully clarified, there remains uncertainty about the possibility of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. We urge Iran to fully co-operate with the Agency to clarify all outstanding questions.
Chair,
We also have to, once again, address Iran’s continued refusal to apply modified Code 3.1. As the Director General states, this is a legal obligation that Iran voluntarily accepted and that cannot be unilaterally suspended or modified. Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities that is not implementing modified Code 3.1. Iran’s unwillingness to provide the Agency with early design information for new nuclear facilities should be especially concerning given Iran’s history of undeclared nuclear facilities. This should not be taken lightly. In light of past and current unresolved questions about Iran’s programme, and several public statements made by current and former Iranian officials concerning Iran’s technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, Iran’s actions further fuel serious doubts over whether Iran’s nuclear activities remain transparent and exclusively peaceful.
Regrettably, Iran’s implementation of the March 2023 Joint Statement with the IAEA has not progressed over the past 18 months. We commend the Agency’s efforts to make progress and we take note of further commitments by Iran to continue discussions on these issues in the future. However, after years of delay, Iran must finally and fully meet its verification commitments and obligations rather than dangle promises of discussions in the future which we have heard many times before.
Finally, we must note that Iran has not yet agreed to reverse its decision to de-designate several of the IAEA’s most experienced inspectors. As the DG has reported, Iran’s decision seriously affects the Agency’s ability to effectively conduct its verification activities in Iran. Iran’s offer to consider “the acceptance of the designation of four additional experienced inspectors” does not provide clarity, and such a limited step may not be able to fully compensate the sudden loss of Agency expertise in this field.
Let us make clear once again Iran must implement its safeguards obligations in full and without further delay. The longstanding nature of these cases risks harm to the broader global non-proliferation architecture and setting dangerous precedents regarding the fulfilment of safeguards obligations.
Chair,
The E3 and the United States commend the DG’s long-standing efforts to engage with Iran. Yet instead of seizing opportunities to engage constructively to resolve all outstanding questions, Iran has failed to offer technically credible information and the necessary cooperation to verify that information.
For over five years now, the Board of Governors has been asking Iran to engage in good faith to resolve the safeguards investigations. Indeed, the Board has passed four resolutions on this matter since 2020, most recently in June 2024. Since June, we have again seen no progress from Iran on safeguards and on the outstanding issues.
In June, this Board stated that if Iran continued to fail to provide the necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, further action would be necessary. This is the reason why we have tabled a resolution at this Board requesting the DG to compile a Comprehensive Report, for consideration by the March 2025 Board of Governors or at the latest by Spring.
Given these long outstanding issues, we believe it is important for the Board to be provided with a clear and updated assessment of all information available, allowing the Board to consider whether further steps are needed. As the resolution sets out, Iran’s cooperation with the Agency will be reflected in the requested assessment. This could therefore include positive and meaningful progress on outstanding issues in the coming months. It is again up to Iran to provide the technically credible explanations and substantive cooperation needed to inform the Agency’s reports and therefore the next steps on these issues. We sincerely hope Iran takes this opportunity to resolve these outstanding issues so that no further Board action is necessary.
Our efforts are intended to provide resolute support to the Agency – for the sake of the integrity of the international non-proliferation architecture and ultimately, global security. We cannot allow Iran to evade its NPT-related safeguards obligations year after year.
Chair,
We once again thank the DG for his commitment and express our unwavering support to the Agency for its impartial and professional work. We encourage the DG to continue to report to the Board in a timely manner and ask for the report contained in GOV/2024/62, as well as, if adopted, the resolution, to be derestricted and made public.
Thank you, Chair.
