When direct talks between top-level US and Iranian delegations in Islamabad broke up a week ago, the worst seemed inevitable. But the worst – the resumption of US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran and retaliatory strikes by Iran on facilities in the Gulf states – did not, in fact, ensue. Nor, it transpires, did the end of those talks terminate definitively what had been a hasty and ill-prepared diplomatic dialogue of the sort so typical of this US president’s international dealings.
Channels have remained open, communications at some level have been maintained, and Donald Trump now insists – despite Iran apparently having rejected the idea – that those top-level US-Iran talks will resume in Islamabad this week. If indeed they do, that offers a faint ray of hope that the current ceasefire could be prolonged, with the even fainter prospect that the conflict could end.
The past week has not been uneventful, either. After confusion about whether an Israel-Lebanon ceasefire was included in the ceasefire announced before the Islamabad talks, Israeli and Lebanese officials agreed their own 10-day ceasefire, which has more or less held. The two fronts of this war are thus quiet for the first time in more than six weeks.
If the channels for talking have remained open, however, the same, regrettably, does not apply to the channels for shipping, specifically the Strait of Hormuz, which has become the most immediate point of contention. Iran’s first – and welcome – response to the conclusion of the first set of talks in Islamabad was to declare the waterway once again open to all shipping, a declaration that precipitated an immediate fall in oil and other energy prices on global markets, and expressions of relief from the countries, especially in Europe and Southeast Asia, most affected by the closure.
Within 24 hours, however, Iran had once again closed this crucial trade route, and for one simple reason: the US was refusing to lift its blockade of Iranian ports – a blockade it had introduced in an effort to force Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. While it is not entirely clear how complete the US blockade is, any US expectation that Iran would allow free passage so long as its own ports remained blocked has to have been totally unrealistic. This is Iran’s single greatest point of leverage, and one it can ill afford to give up.
That the US has maintained its blockade, despite the brief reopening of the strait, leaves the possibility that the US has now attached other conditions to lifting it, including Iran’s surrender of whatever remains of its highly enriched uranium, and an end to any nuclear programme it might still have. Washington has from time to time indicated that freedom of navigation through the strait was always of secondary importance to the United States, and that if it was so crucial to other countries, then it was up to them to act to force it open, either separately or in alliance with the US.
So long as the US blockade and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz are widely seen, including by Iran, as linked, however, it is likely that it will keep the strait closed, intensifying the dire effects on global trade, transport and travel, and ultimately, the cost of living in many parts of the world. By firing towards two ships that had failed to turn around after the new closure, Iran demonstrated not only its serious intent, but that it was not about to cede its strongest card.
The possible new round of US-Iran talks offers one sign that this stalemate could be broken, although it may be that current US demands will make any significant breakthrough difficult. Another – also difficult, but perhaps more promising – avenue might be through international solidarity. The meeting in Paris last week, chaired by the UK and France and involving almost 50 countries, coincided with Iran’s announcement that it was reopening the strait, which seemed to render its closing agreement – with its pledge of an international mission to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz “when conditions permit” – superfluous.
With the strait once again closed, the UK and France have an opportunity to capitalise on the solidarity shown in Paris, and push for freedom of navigation to be reinstated. This is not a call for military intervention – far from it. It is rather to underline that so many states with a single shared interest can, and should, use all the diplomatic means at their disposal to convince Iran to restore free passage.
If, as the US has stated on several occasions, the Strait of Hormuz is not vital to its interests, then it has nothing to lose from unblocking Iran’s ports in return for Iran allowing normal passage through the strait. The US, Israel and Iran could then move to settle their considerable differences without inflicting any more damage on the rest of the world.
