The United Kingdom remains unequivocally committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Our support for Ukraine is long term, coordinated, and grounded in the shared understanding that European security is indivisible. Upholding the principles of the Helsinki Final Act is not optional; it is essential to stability across the OSCE area. Continued support to Ukraine is both a legal and strategic necessity.
The United Kingdom attaches particular importance to the core purpose of the Forum for Security Co-operation to discuss politico-military issues on the basis of professional military expertise, factual analysis, and transparency. Our assessments are grounded in open-source information and, wherever possible, independent third‑party verification, not in state-sponsored propaganda. Preserving the FSC as a space for professional politico‑military dialogue, rather than one shaped by escalation through disingenuous politicisation, is essential if this body is to contribute meaningfully to risk and escalation management and stability.
With that in mind and in line with the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security and drawing on open‑source reporting and observable trends, our statement today highlights the growing imbalance between the costs Russia is incurring in Ukraine and the limited military gains it is achieving. These dynamics have clear implications for regional stability, military sustainability, and escalation management — core concerns of the FSC.
At the outset, let me be clear the United Kingdom is horrified by the scale of human loss that this war has produced. All military casualties are tragic. Mass casualties, force degradation, and fiscal strain in any major military power have direct implications for regional stability, escalation risk, and the overall security environment that concerns this Forum. These dynamics affect us all, not only Russia. In 2025, Russian forces reportedly sustained approximately 420,000 casualties, including up to 200,000 killed, while occupying an additional estimated 0.8 per cent of Ukrainian territory. In 2026, those returns have worsened further.
In 2026, Russian losses remain exceptionally high. Even during winter, when operations were partially constrained, average monthly casualties in early 2026 exceeded 30,000, only slightly below the 2025 monthly average of around 35,000. As Russian forces inevitably intensify assaults over the summer and move toward the dense urban belt in Donetsk oblast, casualty rates are likely to return to, or surpass, last year’s record levels. The proportion of losses that are killed, captured, or permanently wounded is reportedly at its highest level to date, placing additional strain on Russia’s mobilisation system.
These losses add to an estimated cumulative total of roughly 1.3 million casualties since the start of the full‑scale invasion. From a security‑governance perspective, these figures point to a conflict trajectory that is neither militarily decisive nor sustainable over the longer term without increasingly severe political and economic trade‑offs. But this is a conscious choice that President Putin has made.
As the pool of volunteers shrinks, Russia faces narrowing mobilisation options. Financial incentives have become more expensive, while large‑scale compulsory mobilisation would risk domestic instability. Most of Russia’s pre‑war professional force has been depleted, forcing commanders to rely on basic, attritional tactics conducted by minimally trained recruits.
Russia’s inability to generate a strategic reserve further undermines operational effectiveness and increases instability along the line of contact. Forces cannot be concentrated for offensive action without exposing other sectors, a vulnerability exploited by Ukrainian counter‑operations near Dobropillia and Kupiansk, where approximately 200 square kilometres have recently been liberated.
These personnel challenges are reflected in rising costs. Russian spending on military manpower increased from approximately USD 39 billion in 2024 to over USD 50 billion in 2025, or around ten per cent of total government spending. Reports indicate that compensation payments to families of fallen soldiers now exceed spending on salaries for serving personnel — an indicator of both the scale of losses and their long‑term fiscal impact.
These cumulative military pressures underline a broader point relevant to this Forum prolonged violations of the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act — sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes — carry mounting costs not only for the victims of aggression, but also for the aggressor’s own security and stability.
Russia’s continued aggression has weakened its own military capacity, eroded its economic foundations, and increased risk across the OSCE area. The United Kingdom takes no satisfaction in the scale of Russian casualties. The loss of life is a tragic consequence of a war that Russia alone chose to initiate and can move to end.
By contrast, Ukraine’s partners remain united, better resourced, and resolved to continue support for as long as required. Support increased significantly in 2025, and long‑term financial instruments now underpin Ukraine’s resilience into 2027. We will not tire, we will not fragment, and we will not be deterred by escalation narratives. Our commitment to Ukraine is grounded in international law, reinforced by capability, and sustained by collective will.
Finally, the UK stands in solidarity with Romania and we commend the measured and responsible response to the repeated and unacceptable violations of its sovereign airspace. The UK remains firmly committed to NATO’s collective defence, including through the deployment of Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons under NATO’s Enhanced Air Policing mission, and we reiterate our unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression.
