Chair,
The United Kingdom expresses deep gratitude to IAEA staff, who continue to operate in the most challenging circumstances, for their professionalism and courage in their ongoing work supporting nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine.
Chair,
Russia’s sustained and reckless attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure are deliberately degrading the electrical systems that nuclear facilities rely on for safety.
These actions fail to meet the expectations set by this Board, including the December 2024 resolution on Implications of Unstable Energy Infrastructure Critical to Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Plants and the November 2025 statement supported by 57 countries. Despite these clear messages, Russia has only escalated its actions.
This is why we supported convening this Board the Director General’s warnings make clear we cannot wait until March while the situation deteriorates at pace. As we have said before at this Board, Russia is directly accountable for the nuclear safety and security challenges Ukraine faces.
Chair,
The Governor of the Russian Federation claims the situation has not changed fundamentally since November. The same reports from the DG he encouraged us to read paint a different picture – a clear and accelerating deterioration.
On 5 December, the DG highlighted the risks of “continued degradation of the grid” and growing instability, emphasising that the substations being hit are “absolutely indispensable” for reactor cooling.
By 11 December, he reported power disruptions were causing fluctuating outputs, temporary disconnections and forced outages at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), making the fragile grid “one of the biggest challenges” to nuclear safety.
On 19 December, ZNPP suffered its 12th total loss of offsite power, with the DG noting that strikes against the grid appear “coordinated to maximise disruption”, causing “cumulative impacts on NPP operations”
Just days later, on 23 December, Khmelnytskyy and Rivne NPPs were again forced to reduce output after several critical substations were hit. IAEA monitors confirmed the grid was now in “its worst condition since the Agency began monitoring.”
In January, the DG has continued to document further degradation damage to additional substations, repeated line disconnections at Chornobyl, multiple emergency diesel generator activations, and operating NPPs once again compelled to cut output. He reiterated that “deterioration of Ukraine’s power grid from persistent military activity has direct implications for nuclear safety.”
Against this backdrop, Russia’s hypocrisy is stark on 19 January, the head of ROSATOM warned that ZNPP’s reliance on a single power line was “a critical situation for the safety of the plant”, even as wider military activity continues to undermine the stability of the grid he says is essential.
Russia also argues that these are minor issues, that monitoring substations falls outside the Agency’s mandate, and that losses of offsite power are “insignificant”. Again, we prefer to rely on the IAEA’s reporting which shows Ukraine’s grid is degrading rapidly as a result of Russian attacks, with repeated disruptions to NPP offsite power and growing dependence on backup systems. This Board requested that reporting because offsite power is essential to nuclear safety. If the grid continues to weaken, the margin for safely cooling reactors and spent fuel becomes thinner with every outage. This is a clear risk to the safe operation of nuclear facilities.
Chair,
The United Kingdom condemns Russia’s reckless disregard for nuclear safety. We urge Russia to heed the Director General’s warnings and the multiple warnings from this Board.
Thank you.