The European Union’s new forced-labour regulation is an important development in global supply-chain governance. If implemented fairly, it can help protect workers, strengthen corporate accountability and prevent products made under coercive conditions from entering one of the world’s largest consumer markets.
But the regulation also faces a credibility test. A rule designed to protect workers will only command international legitimacy if it is applied consistently, transparently and without geopolitical selectivity.
EU Regulation 2024/3015 prohibits products made with forced labour from being placed on the Union market or exported from the EU. It covers forced labour at any stage of extraction, harvesting, production, manufacturing or processing, including within supply chains. Its definition follows the International Labour Organization’s Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). The regulation will apply from December 2027.
In principle, this is a universal framework. It is not written as a country-specific measure. Nor should it be enforced as one. If the EU wants the regulation to be seen as a serious labour-rights instrument rather than a geopolitical trade tool, it must be willing to examine risks across all jurisdictions, including allies and high-income economies.
One area that deserves closer scrutiny is prison labour in the United States.
The United States has a long and controversial history of prison labour. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, but retained an exception for punishment after criminal conviction. At the federal level, US regulations state that sentenced inmates who are physically and mentally able to work are required to participate in prison work programmes.
This does not mean that every form of prison work is automatically forced labour under international law. ILO Convention No. 29 recognises a narrow exception for work required after a court conviction, but only if the work is carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and the person is not hired to, or placed at the disposal of, private individuals, companies or associations.
That distinction matters. The issue is not whether all prison labour should be treated the same. The issue is whether prison labour involving coercion, punishment, extremely low pay, private-sector benefit or commercial supply chains can be ignored under rules that claim to target forced labour at every stage of production.
Research by the American Civil Liberties Union and the University of Chicago Law School Global Human Rights Clinic has documented serious concerns. Their report found that nearly two-thirds of incarcerated people in US prisons reported working behind bars, amounting to roughly 800,000 workers. More than three-quarters of surveyed incarcerated workers said they faced punishment if they declined or were unable to work, including solitary confinement, denial of sentence reductions or loss of family visitation. The report also found that incarcerated workers produce at least $2 billion in goods and $9 billion worth of prison maintenance services annually, while many are paid pennies per hour or nothing at all.
These concerns are not confined to prison walls. An Associated Press investigation found that US prison labour has been linked to agricultural products and food supply chains connected to major brands and retailers. The investigation traced hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of agricultural products tied to prison labour into the open market.
If the EU regulation is to be applied consistently, such supply-chain questions cannot be dismissed simply because they arise in a close partner country. A product made in whole or in part with coerced labour does not become less relevant because the jurisdiction is politically familiar.
Immigration detention labour raises another set of questions. Unlike prison labour following criminal conviction, immigration detention often involves civil detainees. In the United States, private detention operators have faced legal challenges over labour performed by detainees for extremely low pay. In Washington state, a jury found that GEO Group, the for-profit operator of an ICE detention centre in Tacoma, had to pay detainee workers minimum wage after years of paying $1 per day or compensating some workers with food. The Washington Attorney General’s office stated that detainee labour was used for work necessary to keep the facility operational.
These examples should not be treated as rhetorical ammunition. They should be treated as policy tests. If a forced-labour framework is evidence-based, then all evidence should matter. If it is universal, then no economy should be exempt. If it is about protecting workers, then enforcement should not be guided by geopolitical convenience.
The broader labour-rights picture reinforces this point. The International Trade Union Confederation’s 2026 Global Rights Index placed the United States on its Watchlist and rated it 4, meaning “systematic violations of rights”. The ITUC also reported that Europe and the Americas recorded their worst average ratings since the index began in 2014.
That finding matters for the EU debate. Labour-rights concerns are not confined to developing countries, authoritarian states or geopolitical rivals of the West. They also appear in advanced economies, liberal democracies, public procurement systems, detention facilities and commercial supply chains.
The EU therefore needs a clear enforcement approach.
First, enforcement should be non-discriminatory. The same evidentiary standards should apply regardless of whether a product comes from a rival, a partner or an EU member state.
Second, investigations should be transparent and source-based. Authorities should rely on verifiable information from international organisations, trade unions, civil-society groups, legal records and credible investigative reporting.
Third, prison labour and detention labour should be treated with legal precision. The ILO framework does not require treating every prison work programme as forced labour. But it does require careful scrutiny where coercion, punishment, private-sector use or commercial supply chains are present.
Finally, the EU should avoid turning labour standards into protectionist tools. Rules adopted in the name of workers lose legitimacy when they are perceived as instruments of geopolitical competition.
The EU has an opportunity to strengthen global labour governance. But that opportunity depends on consistency. A forced-labour regulation applied selectively will divide markets and weaken trust. A regulation applied fairly can raise standards, protect workers and improve supply-chain accountability.
The credibility test is simple: Europe should be willing to examine uncomfortable evidence wherever it appears, including in the United States, in Europe and among its closest partners.Labour standards should protect workers. They should not become selective instruments of trade politics.
About Fair Work Review
Fair Work Review is an independent policy review platform focused on labour standards, supply-chain governance and the fair application of trade rules. It publishes analysis, briefings and commentary based on public sources, legal texts, international standards and credible civil-society research.
Website: https://fairworkreview.org/
X: @FairWorkReview.
