Chair,
The United Kingdom reiterates our support for the IAEA’s work to support nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine.
We remain concerned that the IAEA was forced to conduct the most recent ISAMZ rotation through Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territory via the Russian Federation. The DG’s report explains the challenges the Agency has faced in obtaining security guarantees and ensuring the safety of the ISAMZ teams during rotations. The safety of Agency personnel must not be compromised.
We welcome the DG’s continued commitment to this Board that the Agency will comply with UN General Assembly resolution 11/4 adopted on 12 October 2022 and all relevant resolutions from the IAEA policy making organs. All rotations must be conducted using routes agreed with the Government of Ukraine and with full respect of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Chair,
The Agency’s assessment of the overall safety situation at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is that it remains “precarious”.
For more than a month, ZNPP has been relying on a single external power line due to military activity near the site – a drastic reduction from the ten lines available before the conflict. This Board is now, sadly, accustomed to hearing about the vulnerability of the off-site power supply to ZNPP – such disruption increases the risk of a nuclear accident. There can be no room for complacency.
The DG’s report highlights multiple other safety concerns at ZNPP signs of potential degradation of equipment (paragraph 35), persistent “near daily” military activity around the plant, and obstruction, including by Russian troops, of access, which limits the IAEA’s ability to independently carry out its vital mission.
We agree with the Agency’s assessment that in the current circumstances no reactor should be restarted. Any proposal to do so would be irresponsible and pose unacceptable risks to nuclear safety.
Chair,
Russia’s systematic strikes on Ukraine’s energy system, reports of drones, air raids and anti-aircraft fire continue to highlight the fragility of the situation in Ukraine. As a result of Russia’s irresponsible behaviour, all three of Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants have been forced to reduce power supply and operate on “significantly degraded off-site energy backup systems” which, as the DG notes, “increases the likelihood of the total collapse of the electrical grid.”
In addition, damage caused when a drone struck the Chornobyl New Safe Confinement in February has compromised its intended confinement function and its planned lifetime.
Chair,
Financial support from the international community, including the UK, has provided Ukraine with vital safety and security equipment and enabled the IAEA to maintain a continuous presence – 196 missions so far – across Ukraine’s five nuclear sites. This provides the international community with the only source of regular, independent reporting on the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine.
Nuclear safety and security in Ukraine remains at risk for as long as Russia continues its aggression. A lasting peace – one that fully respects Ukraine’s sovereignty, including over its nuclear facilities within its internationally recognised borders – is the only path forward.
Thank you, Chair.
