Looking back, clues to this final system had been there all season.
Doku’s one-against-one threat on the left had required teams to double up on him since August. O’Reilly’s runs began to bear fruit as early as September.
Silva’s intelligent pressing and build-up helped mitigate City’s areas of weakness from November onwards.
Haaland and Semenyo moving in-field as Nunes pushed up to provide width, supplied by the two-footed Cherki, gave City solutions teams were unable to prepare for.
Behind them, Khusanov’s pace provided City with a get-out-of-jail-free card when they held their high line.
Their press evolved too. Guardiola tried several versions through the year before settling on one where the wingers pressed centre-backs while blocking passes wide, with Haaland and Cherki blocking the middle of the pitch. Those roles suited the more physical wingers and protected the less defensive Haaland and Cherki.
City were compact and Silva and Rodri swept up any second balls too.
A common myth in football is that “playing like Guardiola” is creating a side that looks like Barcelona did in 2009.
Guardiola has admitted that he wins because of the players he has, which is partly down to City’s ability to spend big.
His ability to continually reinvent his squads in response to the players he has available and the tactical trends of the league, however, remains second to none.
