Chair,
France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States thank the Director General for his latest reports and commend the Agency’s continued efforts to ensure the implementation of safeguards by Iran and verify the implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions by Iran. We reiterate our full support for the Agency’s professional, independent, and impartial work which remains indispensable to upholding the integrity of the NPT’s global safeguards architecture.
Chair,
This Board comes at a crucial moment in time
It has been a year since this Board found Iran in non-compliance with its legal obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. This followed a long and well documented pattern, spanning more than two decades, of insufficient cooperation with the Agency on safeguards and extensive reporting by the IAEA Director General regarding concerns around undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Since then, rather than remedying the points of concern voiced by the Board, Iran has taken steps that have even deepened its non-compliance.
It has been a year, too, since Iran last allowed the Agency to inspect the most proliferation-sensitive facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. We deeply regret that, since the last meeting of the Board, Iran has continued to prevent the Agency from conducting in-field verification activities, with the exception of the Bushehr power plant. Iran has likewise failed to implement the special measures provided for by the NPT Safeguards Agreement, including by not producing the reports the IAEA has requested on Iran’s affected nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material.
As a consequence, the Agency was unable to discharge its safeguards and verification responsibilities stemming from both Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Therefore, the Agency cannot draw a safeguards conclusion for 2025 in respect of Iran’s previously declared nuclear material, that it has been unable to verify, including 440 kg of high-enriched uranium. It should be of concern to all Members of this Board that the Agency is unable to verify whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, particularly in the context of the newly declared facility in Isfahan. For a year, Iran’s HEU has remained unaccounted for. As the Director General’s report reminds us, Iran remains the only state without nuclear weapons to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60%. The Director General has reported that access is long overdue and the lack of access is a matter of proliferation concern and of compliance with Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.
In addition, Iran is still failing to implement modified Code 3.1, contrary to its NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of UN Security Council and Board resolutions. Iran also continues to ignore Security Council and Board resolutions which call for the immediate implementation of its Additional Protocol.
Finally, the DG’s report reminds us of the long history of Iran’s failure to address unresolved safeguards issues, and that the Agency has outstanding concerns about the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
Chair,
We recognise that Agency verification activities in Iran have been impacted due to safety concerns. However, the Director General’s reports since then clearly show that Iran is fully able to facilitate IAEA inspections on the ground when it determines such visits are in its interests. But rather than allow the IAEA to return to full implementation of its mandate, which would help build confidence in the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, Iran instead continues to obstruct the Agency’s ability to conduct its crucial safeguards work. We call on Iran to urgently reconsider this approach and allow the IAEA to conduct necessary in-field verification activities at all declared facilities in Iran. The Agency has made repeatedly clear that there is no current technical or nuclear safety reason preventing the inspectors from doing so.
No state under the NPT should be allowed to stonewall the IAEA and disregard its legally binding obligations. Not only do Iran’s actions raise urgent concerns regarding the nature of its nuclear programme, they also threaten the very integrity of the global nuclear safeguards regime. The longer Iran continues to disregard its obligations, the more it undermines the non-proliferation regime that protects us all. It is of utmost importance that this Board takes action to uphold the NPT and protects the indispensable role of the Agency in verifying safeguards implementation. We all must continue to hold Iran accountable.
We urge Iran to immediately return to full compliance with its legally binding obligations arising from its NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Iran’s obligations are not negotiable, we reiterate the Director General’s statement that the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances. The draft resolution introduced by the US and the E3 underlines these obligations and specifically details the concrete and immediate steps Iran must take to return to full compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
Chair,
We fully support the ongoing diplomatic efforts towards a negotiated solution that ensures in a verifiable and sustainable way that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon. We remain committed to diplomacy and to working with all Board members to uphold the authority of the IAEA and the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. With this, we take note of the reports contained in GOV/2026/33 and GOV/INF/2026/9 and ask that they be made public.
Thank you, Chair.