Thank you, Mr Chair.
Let me start by strongly condemning Russia’s continued attacks against civilian infrastructure. Russian strikes on energy infrastructure have deprived millions of heat and water during a harsh winter. And earlier this week, a Russian drone hit a passenger train in Kharkiv, killing innocent civilians. We cannot allow these tactics to become normalised we have a responsibility in this forum to continue to condemn these barbaric attacks in the clearest terms. The UK does so today.
Mr Chair, there is a persistent Russian narrative claiming that its illegal war against Ukraine could have been avoided had Europe and Ukraine “seized opportunities” for dialogue between 2014 and 2022. That narrative does not withstand scrutiny. Allow me to set the record straight.
The events of 2014 did not begin with a “coup”. They began in November 2013, when President Yanukovych abruptly suspended preparations to sign the EU‑Ukraine Association Agreement, despite strong public support, following intense political and economic pressure from Russia. Peaceful protests were met with escalating violence by state security forces.
On 21 February 2014, President Yanukovych and opposition leaders signed an EU‑mediated agreement providing for constitutional reform, a national unity government, and early presidential elections. Russia declined to sign that agreement. Had Russia lent its support, perhaps the outcome might have been different. Soon after, amid nationwide outrage at killings in Kyiv, Yanukovych fled the country, along with key governmental figures, leaving no functioning authority to implement the agreement. In response, Ukraine’s parliament voted that Yanukovych had removed himself from his constitutional duties and called early elections. This was an extraordinary response to an extraordinary situation – not a coup d’état.
Russia took advantage of the situation to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by seizing Crimea, in clear breach of the UN Charter. This was condemned by an overwhelming majority of UN General Assembly members.
The Minsk Agreements that followed offered a framework to halt the fighting in eastern Ukraine. They failed because Russian-backed forces repeatedly violated the ceasefire and refused to meet the security conditions required for political steps to proceed. Russia was not a neutral mediator. It supplied weapons, fighters, and command support to armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk, while insisting that Ukraine implement political provisions without the security guarantees that Minsk itself required.
Finally, Russia claims its December 2021 proposals represented a last attempt at diplomacy. In fact, they demanded unacceptable limits on NATO, denied sovereign states the right to choose their own security arrangements, and sought to rewrite the foundations of European security; all with totally unreasonable tight deadlines. The United States and NATO responded with concrete offers to discuss arms control, transparency, and risk‑reduction measures. We engaged with these proposals and did not refuse dialogue. What we refused was an ultimatum incompatible with the Helsinki Final Act.
Mr Chair, colleagues, facts matter. Russia’s war against Ukraine was not the result of missed opportunities by others, but of deliberate choices taken by Russia itself. Russia has always had the best opportunities to ensure peace it could have chosen not to illegally annex Crimea, not to orchestrate war in the Donbas, not to launch a full-scale invasion. And equally, Russia – unlike Ukraine and Europe – could achieve peace tomorrow by withdrawing its forces from Ukraine’s internationally-recognised territory. We urge them to do so.
Thank you.