Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States to respond to misleading claims about Australia’s acquisition of a naval
nuclear propulsion capability through the AUKUS partnership. We are once
again compelled to invoke our Right of Reply to address remarks that
purposefully mischaracterise the nature of our collaboration.
Australia’s cooperation with the UK and US on this matter is being undertaken
in full compliance with our respective obligations under the NPT, Treaty of
Rarotonga, and Australia’s safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
The repeated attempts by one member state to add this item to this meeting’s
agenda falsely implies an active compliance problem where none exists and
continues to distract from other matters that require the Board’s attention.
Chair,
Under this item, the Board continues to hear unsubstantiated claims that ignore
or misrepresent information AUKUS partners have provided in good faith, and
assertions that disregard the statements made by the Director General. I would
like to remind the Board of five things
First, Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines will be conventionally
armed. Australia does not have and will not seek to acquire or
manufacture nuclear weapons, nor will the UK nor the US provide any
assistance, encouragement or inducement to do so.
Second, naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the
NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement – on which Australia’s CSA is based – is the specific
provision to support the right of states to use nuclear material in a nonproscribed
military activity within the legal framework for safeguards
implementation, including for naval nuclear propulsion.
Third, the IAEA has the clear authority under its Statute, and extensive
precedent, to negotiate directly and in-confidence with individual
Member States on the establishment and application of safeguards and
verification arrangements. Interference would politicise the IAEA’s
independence, mandate and technical authority, and establish a deeply
harmful precedent.
Fourth, it is also not true that the transfer of high enriched uranium from a
Nuclear-Weapon State to a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State runs counter to
the NPT or its spirit. The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment
level among States Parties is not prohibited by the NPT, provided the
transfer is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards
obligations. Australia’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered
submarine programme will be subject to a robust package of verification
measures consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.
Fifth, under Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will be enabled
to continue meeting its technical objectives at all stages of the
submarines’ lifecycle. Once the Article 14 arrangement is agreed
between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat, the Director General has
stated that he will transmit it to the Board for ‘appropriate action’. The
Board will certainly not be bypassed.
Chair,
We continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item,
or any efforts that undermine and politicise the independent, technical mandate
of the Agency.
All three AUKUS partners continue to take seriously our commitment to
openness and transparency with member states on this matter, and we will
continue to engage in good faith on genuine questions.
Consistent with our approach since our partnership was announced in 2021, we
will provide an update to the Board under ‘Any Other Business’ and welcome
the Director General’s continued commitment to provide updates on naval
nuclear propulsion, as and when he deems appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.
