Chair,
Since Russia’s illegal invasion in March 2022, the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate. The UK is grateful to the Agency for its work with Ukraine to help decrease the risk of a nuclear accident, and to the IAEA personnel who continue to operate under the most challenging of circumstances.
The risks that the ISAMZ team has been subjected to over this reporting period – including the attack on their vehicle on their journey to ZNPP in December, and their extended stay at the plant due to intense military activity in the area – are unacceptable. The ISAMZ staff affected have the UK’s upmost sympathy and gratitude.
We are concerned that the IAEA was forced to conduct the most recent ISAMZ rotation through Russian temporarily controlled territory. It is imperative that this be an exception, on humanitarian grounds, and that future rotations are implemented using routes agreed with the Government of Ukraine and with full respect of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. We welcome the DG’s commitment to this Board that the Agency will continue to comply fully with UN General Assembly resolution 11 / 4 adopted on 12 October 2022 and all relevant resolutions of the IAEA policy-making organs.
Three years after Russia’s illegal and irresponsible seizure of ZNPP we are grateful for ISAMZ’s continued reporting on the nuclear safety situation, where the unreliable water and electricity supply to the plant, and military activity within its vicinity, continue to pose challenges. We remain deeply concerned that ISAMZ still do not receive timely access to all relevant areas of the plant – despite repeated calls from this Board.
Chair,
Over the reporting period we have seen heightened military activity near all of Ukraine’s NPPs and continued Russian attacks on substations connected to those plants – a situation so serious that an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Governors had to be convened in December.
At that Board, we heard the Russian Ambassador claim that there was no decisive link between energy infrastructure and nuclear safety at NPPs. Contrary to this claim, paragraphs 26 to 30 of the DG’s report provide a useful overview of relevant IAEA Safety Standards and other publications, which make clear the need for NPPs to have reliable and stable power supply so that safety can be maintained.
Chair,
A drone hitting and causing a fire on the large protective structure at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant adds to the ongoing risks to nuclear safety and security posed by military activity in Ukraine.
We are relieved that despite significant damage caused by the fire, which lasted over two weeks and required over 150 holes to be cut in the external cladding to extinguish, there has been no change in radiation levels at the site. But the DG’s assessment that the damage could have an undetermined “adverse” impact on nuclear safety in the long term is extremely worrying.
In view of the precarious situation, we appreciate that staff and management of Chornobyl NPP are regularly exchanging information with the IAEA team on the ground.
Chair,
The work of this Board is serious. It is a forum for debate, discussion and decisions, not for spreading propaganda and false narratives. Colleagues who were here last year heard me express concern about deliberate attempts at gaslighting by some members of this Board, creating false narratives to try to make others question their perceptions of the truth and question the truth about events. Such game-playing as no place in a serious Board such as this.
Thank you Chair.
